

well known in Irish legend. It means the slave or servant of Nuadha, and belongs to a group of Irish proper names which I take to be of a Non-Aryan origin, and to mark the præ-Celtic race of Ireland. Another of the same kind was Mogh Néid, the slave or servant of Néid; for the Ancient Irish had a god of war called Néid or Nét.

This kind of nomenclature, I need hardly say, is well known on Semitic ground: take, for instance, the biblical *Abdiel*, "servant of God," or the inscriptional *Abdastartus*, "servant of Astarte." On the other hand the Aryans gave the preference to compounds such as the Sanskrit *Deva-datta*, Greek *Θεό-δοτος*, or the Welsh *Cad-wal*, Irish *Cath-al*, Old German *Hatho-wulf*, or the wolf of war. To return to Lydney, the name *Nodens*, genitive *Nodentis* is precisely what would make in Irish, according to the phonological laws of that language, a nominative *Nuadha*, genitive *Nuadhat*, that is on the supposition that the first syllable of the god's name was long, *Nōdens* or *Nūdēns*; further, corresponding to an Irish nominative *Nuadha*, the Welsh form should be *Nudd*, with *ū* pronounced nearly like German *ü*, and *dd* like *th* in the English word *this*; and *Nudd* occurs in Welsh both in prose and verse, namely, in connection with *Edern son of Nudd* and *Gwyn son of Nudd*, where it probably meant a god-ancestor rather than the father; compare Bran son of Llyr, that is, Bran son of the Sea. Even the hesitation in spelling between *Nodens* and *Nudens* fits exactly into Welsh phonology, which makes both the *ō* and the *ū* of the language in its early period into *ū* in its later stages; from the Lydney inscriptions this would seem to have been nearly accomplished in the first century.

It is unfortunate that Welsh literature gives us no information as to the attributes of *Nudd*; the case is much the same with *Nuadha* in Irish literature, but it is right to say that the latter makes *Nuadha* to be a king of the *Tuatha Dé Danann*, that is to say, king of the most mythical race in Irish legend, and the following passage in O'Curry's *Lectures on the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish* (iii. 156) is to the point, though he gives no reference to the original, which he had in view in it:—"The river Boyne, from the clearness of its waters, was poetically called *Rígh Mná Nuadhat*; that is, the wrist or forearm of *Nuadhat's* wife. This lady was one of the *Tuatha Dé Danann*; and the poetical allusion to her arm originated from her keeping it constantly covered with rings or bracelets of gold to bestow upon poets and musicians." I am inclined to think that the term *Rígh Mná Nuadhat* had a much deeper meaning, and that it is, in fact, a relic of Irish mythology. For there is good ground for believing that the Boyne was personified and probably worshipped; I conclude this from the meaning of its name, which was in Old Irish *Bóind*, genitive *Bóindeo*, and in Ptolemy's *Geography* *Βοοινίδα*, i.e., *Buwinda*, which has been equated and, no doubt, correctly with the Sanskrit adjective *govinda*, which, according to the *Petersburg Dictionary*, means "acquiring or winning cows or herds," and occurs as an epithet to *Brhaspati*, *Kṛṣṇa*, and *Vishnu*. In Cormac's *Glossary* we learn that the Boyne had another name, *Bergna* or *Bregna*, which also appears to have been personal. In Britain, the Dee, for example, was undoubtedly regarded as a divine stream, and probably also Ptolemy's *Belisama* wrongly identified in my *Lectures on Welsh Philology*

with the Dee. If, then, the Boyne was such another river divinity, nothing could be more natural than for the muse of mythology, if I may use the term, to marry her to *Nodens*, god of the sea, if it is right, as it seems to be, to describe him as such.

Mr. King touches on several minor points of great interest to Celtic philologists, as, for instance, when he says of *Senilis*, "that his uncommon *cognomen* is probably a translation of his British name, *Hen*, the Old;" but it is hardly necessary to speak here of a translation, as at the date of the dedication *hen* was *sen* in all Celtic languages, and the Welsh change of initial *s* into *h* did not set in for centuries afterwards. With *Senilis* may be compared or contrasted the *Senilus* of the post-Roman inscription of St. Just in Cornwall, see p. 406 of the *Lectures on Welsh Philology*, and also the "*Grammatica Celtica*," p. 769, where an Irish name is mentioned as written *Snill*, with which may be compared the *Senyllt* of later Welsh: more than one of these forms seem to postulate a Latin *Senilius*. Hübner has other instances of *Senilis* besides the one from Lydney. Quite distinct from the fortune of initial *s* was that of vowel-flanked *s*, as it has disappeared without a trace both in Welsh and Irish, and that probably at a very early date: possibly before they had differentiated themselves into distinct languages. The Lydney inscriptions seem to me to give strong indirect evidence to the effect that it had in this country disappeared before the first century; for the best explanation of the doubling of the *s* in *POSSVIT* and *PROMISSIT* is to suppose the inscriber to have been a Celt, in whose language, as in Welsh and Irish, a soft *s* or single *s* between vowels was unknown; his mistake could be copiously paralleled by the way Welshmen of the present day deal with English *s* and *z*. I suspect also that the Celtic word for god, of the same origin and derivation as the Latin *divus* and beginning, as it must have in early Welsh, with the syllable *dēu*, had not a little to do with the spelling *DEVO* in the tablet of *Silvanus*.

I cannot end this somewhat lengthy notice without heartily thanking Mr. King and the Bathursts for a volume so full of interest and so well got up.

JOHN RHŴS

THE RIGHTS OF AN ANIMAL

The Rights of an Animal; a New Essay in Ethics. By Edward Byron Nicholson, M.A., Principal Librarian and Superintendent of the London Institution. (London: C. Kegan Paul and Co., 1879.)

THIS is a little book—too little to be satisfactory. Its object is to argue that "*animals have the same abstract rights of life and personal liberty with man.*" The ambiguity which attaches to the word "same" in this opening statement of the "principle" to be proved casts its shadow over all the remaining sixty pages of which the essay consists. That animals have not in all respects identical "rights of life and liberty with man" is too obvious a truth for even Mr. Nicholson to combat. He neither objects to the slaughtering of animals for food nor to the working of animals for purposes useful to man. Yet if the rights of animals were, strictly speaking, "the same" as those of man, the former act

would be one of murder, and the latter one of unjustifiable slavery. It is clear, therefore, that for the purpose of lucid statement we ought to be supplied with some definition of the sense in which the author supposes the rights of animals to be comparable with those of man. And it is because this definition is nowhere supplied that we deem the work unsatisfactory. That animals, as sentient creatures, have *some* rights—*i.e.*, that man may not kill or torture them needlessly without incurring *some* moral blame—no one nowadays would undertake to dispute.¹ It therefore seems useless to fill a number of pages with a number of truisms on the theme that animals have some rights in common with man. From the writer of "a new essay in ethics" we expected to find a statement of the principles by which the rights of animals ought to be defined—in what they resemble and in what they differ from the rights of man, and why. But instead of this we find only the statement of a fact which it does not require "a new essay in ethics" to reveal, *viz.*, that the immorality of subjecting animals to needless death or torture cannot be justified on the ground of any such irrelevant or untrue arguments as that animals are irrational, not immortal, or non-sentient. Such being the whole scope of the work, it seems to us to be about a century too late in appearing.

At the present time, when the ethics of vivisection and kindred questions are being so warmly discussed, there is a good opportunity for a competent essayist to write an interesting, if not valuable treatise, on the basis, the nature, and the extent of animal rights, as well as the ways and degrees in which these rights ought to be respected by man. The latter subject is lightly touched by Mr. Nicholson in his concluding chapter, entitled "Limitations in Practice." His view appears to be that man has no moral justification in taking the life of any animal, which is not either directly "harmful" to himself or in competition with him in "the struggle for food." Therefore Mr. Nicholson considers it immoral to eat shrimps and lobsters, seeing that they neither "hamper man's comfort nor eat up his food." Criticism here is sufficiently easy. Among animals themselves the only right is might, and therefore if a lobster could argue with a philosopher it is difficult to see on what grounds he could convince the superior animal that the latter has less right to eat him than has his brother lobster. If the lobster were to urge that the philosopher is not merely an animal but a moral animal, the philosopher might answer that he cannot see any moral justification of the lobster's view that the right of an edible animal to live is superior to the right of an eating animal to kill. And if the lobster were unfortunate enough to quote Mr. Nicholson as an authority to prove that man has a moral right to kill only "hurtful" animals, it would be competent for the philosopher to reply that if man has a moral right to promote his own happiness by killing animals which cause him harm or annoyance, it is impossible to see why he should not have a similar right to promote his own happiness by killing all animals that serve him for food.

¹ Dr. Whewell is probably the last of competent writers who has done so in the past or is likely to do so in the future. It is remarkable, by the way, that Mr. Nicholson does not quote the passage in which Dr. Whewell sneers at Bentham for maintaining the rights of animals as sentient creatures, for this passage, especially as answered by Mill, would have gone further to argue the existence of obtuseness upon this subject than does any other fact which is mentioned by Mr. Nicholson.

Lastly, if the lobster were to argue that his enemy might secure a doubly beneficial end by limiting his diet only to such animals as are noxious, the philosopher would be compelled to observe that he happened to prefer lobster salad and roast lamb to boiled snakes and rat-pie.

The same inconsistency of principle is displayed where Mr. Nicholson treats of vivisection. He says "much against my feelings I do see a warrant for vivisection in the case of harmful animals and animals which are man's rivals for food." But if man has a moral right to slay a harmful animal *in order to better his own condition*, he must surely have a similar right to slay a harmless animal, *if by so doing he can secure a similar end*. And of course it is the opinion of all sufficiently informed persons that vivisection has been of more service in bettering the condition of humanity than has the destruction, say, of wolves, bears, and tigers, wherever these animals have been destroyed.

OUR BOOK SHELF

Proceedings of the Aberdeenshire Agricultural Association, 1878.

WE have already noticed the earlier field experiments made by this Association. The most prominent fact which they believe they have established is the efficacy of mineral phosphates, when in fine powder, as a manure for turnips. Such phosphates have always been treated with sulphuric acid, and converted into superphosphate before being employed as manure; to employ them in fine powder without this previous treatment would of course be more economical, if they are in this state sufficiently effective.

It would be easy to criticise the experiments on which the above conclusion is based; we might especially point out the very different results which the same manure has yielded on different plots of the same land. The manure has also apparently been incorporated with the soil in a far more perfect manner than would be possible in agricultural practice, and the solvent action of the soil has thus been greatly aided. We must leave therefore any conclusion as to the feasibility of employing finely powdered apatite or coprolite as a manure until repeated trials have been made on a large scale. There are, however, a few facts in the chemistry of the question to which we should like to call attention.

If we were asked to describe a soil which should exercise the greatest solvent action on phosphate of calcium, we should certainly name one containing much humic matter, and little or no carbonate of calcium. The humic matter, and the carbonic acid produced from it, would act as a tolerably powerful solvent for the phosphate, if carbonate of calcium were not present to neutralise their efficacy. Now the granite soils of Aberdeen belong precisely to the class of soil just described; if, therefore, it should be finally proved that finely-powdered mineral phosphates are almost as effective as superphosphate on land of this character, it will by no means follow that the same result will be obtained if the phosphate is applied to other soils, and especially to those derived from limestone rocks.

As to the effect of nitrogenous manures on the turnip crop, the conclusion first arrived at by the Association has been somewhat modified. In the previous report it was stated that the only effect of nitrogenous manure was to increase the amount of water in the crop; this extraordinary conclusion has not been confirmed by the succeeding experiments. As the turnip crop contains a large amount of nitrogen as a necessary constituent, it is clearly ridiculous to speak of nitrogenous manures as